THE FAILURE TO REGULATE THE GAMBLING INDUSTRY EFFECTIVELY: INCENTIVES FOR PERPETUAL NON-COMPLIANCE 
John Warren Kindt . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Gambling is a major destructive force in today’s society. Despite its negative effects, the current regulator system is ineffective. This article explores the gambling interests influence over politicians and regulators. It also exposes how the industry circumvents, breaks and ignores regulations by examining the close relationship it has with government. Furthermore, this article discusses the connection between the gambling industry and both organized crime and whitecollar crime. To cure these problems, the author proposes several policies to corral the industry. His primary suggestion is to increase taxes on gambling operations in order to pay for the social costs gambling creates. Finally, the author argues for greater and more effective regulations over the industry. Articles Editor, David Schmidt.

A CASE OF "WHEN" RATHER THAN "WHAT:" TENDER OFFERS UNDER THE WILLIAMS ACT AND THE ALL HOLDERS AND BEST PRICE RULES Rusty A. Fleming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Tender offers serve an important role in corporate America today. However, recent inconsistencies throughout the Circuits have abandoned the goals of certainty and investor protection in securities law. This inconsistency surrounds the "all holders" and "best price" rules under the Williams Act. The author explores the history of rulings involving the all holders and best price rules, including a detailed analysis of the facts of each case and the various rationales developed by the Circuits. This discussion leads the author to conclude that all of the conflicting Circuit approaches are flawed. Accordingly, a definitive safeharbor provision is necessary so that tender offers can proceed without violation of the all holders and best price rules. This is the only way to provide both certainty and investor protection. Articles Editor, J. Michael Ward.

LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: DOES THE CONSTITUTION BAR THE APPLICATION OF SOME ETHICS RULES TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH ATTORNEYS?
Edward C. Carter III .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 The transformation of the legal profession’s ethical rules from platitudes to law that governs the profession has resulted in the eruption of intra-profession controversy over their construction and application. Nowhere has that intraprofession disputation been more intense than in the criminal law bar where professional ethics have become the focus of a bitter conflict between prosecutors and bar associations. The casus belli of these " ethics wars" has been the organized bar’s efforts to have three particular ethical rules applied to prosecutors in ways that go beyond the legal and constitutional limits on the manner and extent to which executive branch attorneys can be involved in police and grand jury investigations. This article examines whether application of those three ethical rules to executive branch attorneys in those ways violates the separation of powers principle of the United States and Illinois constitutions and whether the application of two of those ethical rules to executive branch attorneys in those ways also constitutes ultra vires action by the judiciary and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Articles Editor, Shane M. Carnine.

THE IMPACT OF COPYRIGHT LAW ON DISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS: HOW FAIR USE AND THE CONFU GUIDELINES MAY SHAPE THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIA
Robert Thornburg . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Throughout the last century, universities have increasingly offered distance education programs, through which students can receive an undergraduate, graduate, or professional degree without physically attending the actual campus. Although many benefits naturally accompany this type of technological advancement, many problems are also inherently attendant. Perhaps most detrimental, the ease with which the programs allow the transfer of information through digital media may risk off-setting the delicate balance between protecting the expression of artists and authors, and allowing these new, on-line students free and unlimited access to copyrighted works. Although Congress once attempted to create guidelines to regulate the dissemination of copyrighted information to students enrolled in these programs, their attempt failed. The resulting ambiguity only intensified the needs of offering institutions for compliance guidelines in order to avoid copyright infringement liability. This comment contends that universities seeking such guidance should look to current interpretations of the fair use doctrine, rather than to CONFU principles, to create their own compliance guidelines. Articles Editor, Tiffany R. Ritchie.

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COMPANY-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE (COLI): WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
George Steven Swan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 The recent case of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue summoned fresh attention to company-owned life insurance (COLI). Many employees do not realize that thier employers have purchased li fe insurance upon their staffs en masse. These purchases are encouraged by legislation at the state level (and, in Canada, at the provincial level). Such statutes address the insurable interest requirement. That requirement relates to the problems of gambling, moral hazard, and externalities. Externality is an economic concept which must relate to COLI even supposing the passage of the Life Insurance Employee Notification (LEIN) Bill, which was introduced in Congress during 2002. Perhaps a constructive near-term move would be to legislatively tie COLI proceeds to the funding of employee benefits. Articles Editor, Walter B. Lookofsky.

UNIVERSITIES, CORPORATIONS, AND STATES USE THEM)NOW IT’S TIME TO PROTECT THEM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR OMBUDSMAN AND THE CONTINUED NEED FOR A PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP Christina M. Kuta . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389  In the present time of crowed court dockets, many involved in the justice system are turning to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques for efficient and just solutions to legal issues. One such ADR technique is the use of Ombudsmen’s services in both the private and public sector. While the use of Ombudsman services is expanding, a split of authority still exists as to whether or not Federal Rule of Evidence 501 affords a records privilege to communications with an Ombudsman. This comment traces the history of Ombudsman’s services and develops an overview of current law relating to an Ombudsman privilege. Included in this discussion is an analysis of Rule 501 and the legislative history surrounding its enactment showing congressional support for a privilege. This comment further critically analyzes case law surrounding privilege communications, focusing specifically on two separate suits involving corporate defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The author provides a proposed resolution to include a clear definition of what constitutes and Ombudsman, with a blanket privilege for those whose employment meets the statutory definition.

AMENDING THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR COCAINE OFFENSES: THE 100-TO-1 RATIO IS NOT AS "CRACKED" UP AS SOME SUGGEST Elizabeth Tison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 The current sentencing structure for cocaine offenses is primarily the result of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The Act established mandatory minimum penalties for persons convicted of trafficking in a variety of controlled substances. The Act treated powder cocaine differently than crack cocaine by establishing what has come to be known as the 100-to-1 quantity ratio between the two forms of cocaine. Since that time, the federal sentencing policy for cocaine offenses has received extensive criticism. The United States Sentencing Commission has attempted to make changes to the policy. In 1995, it proposed changes in the treatment of cocaine base, but Congress rejected the proposed amendment. Congress specified that offenses involving equal weights of crack and powder cocaine should not receive equal punishment, and that stricter sentences should be imposed on crack defendants. In 2002, the United States Sentencing Commission issued a report to Congress that recommends several changes to the current crack cocaine sentencing policies and bases those recommendations on new data and statistics. The author proposes a solution to the ongoing crack  cocaine debate and discusses the two major arguments made by proponents to change the 100-to-1 ratio, as well as criticisms of those arguments.

ISOLATING THE PROBLEM BY FINDING THE CONNECTION: THE PROPER APPROACH TO REGULATING GROUNDWATER UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT: IDAHO RURAL COUNCIL V. BOSMA, 143 F. SUPP. 2D 1169 (D. IDAHO 2001)
Susan Griffithe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 The Clean Water Act was enacted to regulate pollutant discharges into "navigable waters." These types of waters are defined typically as "waters of the United States" that affect interstate commerce. A split of authority exists among the federal appellate circuits as to whether pollutants discharged into groundwater falls under the regulatory scope of the Act. One view holds that groundwater should not be regulated by the Act, relying on more of a plain text reading of the statute. The other view holds that groundwater, as long as hydrologically connected to other regulated water, should also be regulated since it could ultimately affect navigable waters. Bosma was a case that took this latter view, placing a heavy burden upon a plaintiff to identify a hydrological connection. This decision represents the line of cases that interpret the scope of regulation more consistently with the purpose of the Clean Water Act. This helps to ensure protection of the environment, yet also creates a balance with industry and commerce by requiring an identifiable hydrological connection in order to discourage frivolous lawsuits.

REVIVING THE ATTORNEY GENERALS’ BRIEF: SOUTHLAND, STARE DECISIS, AND INTRUSION OF STATES’ POLICE POWERS: CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. V. ADAMS, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)
Brian J. Stalets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457 On March 21, 2001, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the United States Supreme Court ruled the proper interpretation of the exemption provision provided in the Federal Arbitration Act is that only employment contracts of "workers of transportation" were excluded from the Act’s coverage. This Case Note focuses on the Court’s rejection of an amicus brief drafted by the attorney generals of twentyone states in which the attorney generals argued that the Court’s interpretation of the exemption provision is an intrusion of states’ police powers because it improperly allows the FAA to preempt state employment laws. The primary reason the Court rejected the attorney generals’ brief was because of reliance on its holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating, ruling that the FAA had the authority to preempt state employments laws. This Case Note argues that Southland lacks the requisite degree of authority needed to justify the Court’s extensive reliance on the case.

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