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SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
LAW JOURNAL
Volume
31
Fall 2006ARTICLES
The Telecommunications Act of 1996: How It Failed, and How It Succeeded
(But Not As Expected)
H. James
Nelson.........................................................................................................................................................
1
The most difficult part of a telecommunications system is the “last mile”:
the link from the central infrastructure to the end user. In the late 20th
century, this last mile was under the monopolistic control of the regional
Bell Operating Companies. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 had, at its
core, the requirement that monopoly be broken and the last mile be made
available to other companies thus increasing competition, decreasing
consumer cost, and increasing the range of services available.
Unfortunately, due to technical hurdles and bureaucratic red tape, this was
never realized. However, another provision of the Act inspired an explosion
of technological innovation, bypassing the last mile and bringing about
unprecedented growth in mobile phones, the Internet, digital cable, fiber,
and other forms of communication.
This article describes the technology climate that existed prior to 1996 and
the legislation that led up to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It
continues with a description of the technological and bureaucratic hurdles
that the competition had to deal with in order to enter the local market.
The article ultimately concludes with a description of today’s technological
landscape and how competition bypassed the BOC’s hurdles. Articles Editor,
Erin R. Doyle
“A New Telecom Act”─Remarks
Richard E.
Wiley.......................................................................................................................................................
17
This article begins by taking you back to where the telecommunications
industry and regulation stood a decade ago; explaining the rationale behind
the structure of the 1996 Act; looking at what has changed over the past 10
years; and, finally, previewing what might lie ahead as Congress considers
the possibility of yet another rewrite of our national communications
legislation.
A decade ago, although convergence (that is, the use of the same
technological platform to provide multiple services) had been talked about
for years, the telecom industry still was characterized by distinct segments
(or “silos”). For example, there was a separate long distance market; local
telephone service was dominated by 8 companies; and the Internet was in its
infancy for commercial purposes.
The purpose of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 was sweeping yet plainly
worded: “To promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies.” To this end, the Act sought to eliminate boundaries between
industry segments in an effort to extend competition to previously
monopolistic areas such as local telephone and cable television service.
Over the past decade since the Act was enacted, every segment of the telecom
industry has undergone a radical transformation. In fact, it is difficult
to say today how much longer there will even be discrete industry segments.
This technological convergence has been accompanied by unprecedented
consolidation among traditional players whose once-secure markets are
eroding out from under them. The simple fact is that technological
convergence and market forces have produced an industry where the
traditional market heavyweights─even as beefed up through consolidation─are
but several of a number of viable and potent competitors, each struggling to
remain ahead of the technological curve and to make its services attractive
to an increasingly sophisticated and demanding customer base.
While visionary when enacted, the 1996 Act has proven to be short-sighted.
The FCC has tried mightily to bring about some form of regulatory parity but
its ability to do so has been severely constrained by the Act’s preexisting
service categories. Without question, Congress needs to get involved once
more in order to bring about a more rational, streamlined
and─hopefully─technology-proof regulatory structure.
In this article, I will discuss the three most important issues regarding
telecom reform: universal service reform; the cable franchise process; and
“net neutrality.” Lastly, I will provide some closing thoughts on where the
telecommunications industry and regulation might stand 10 years from now.
Articles Editor, Aadam Alikhan
Indian Citizenship and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the
United States Constitution: An Alternative to the Problems of the Full Faith
and Credit and Comity?
James B.
Wadley......................................................................................................................................................
31
Members of Indian tribes have long struggled to have the legal decisions and
edicts of their Tribal courts fully recognized and enforced by state courts.
The conventional doctrines of full faith and credit and of comity have often
allowed states that were suspicious or of jealous of Tribal prerogatives to
decline to give them full force and effect, often because tribal processes
could be claimed to be different and therefore somehow inferior or because
tribes are generally not considered to be the equivalent of states. Indians,
however, enjoy a very unique citizenship in the United States. This
citizenship was created by federal statute and, like other types of
citizenship, ought to have certain protected privileges and immunities under
relevant provisions of the United States Constitution. It is argued in this
article that the right to have one’s tribal decrees enforced within the
United States, though outside the boundaries of a reservation, should be a
privilege of tribal citizenship. The difficulty with this position is that
Indian citizenship has never been closely analyzed to fully describe or
determine its privileges and immunities dimensions. This article is intended
to begin a conversation to that effect. Articles Editors, Dan Robinson &
Chris Frericks
COMMENTS
Up-Skirt and Other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and Other Technologies
Require a New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places
Kristin M.
Beasley......................................................................................................................................................
69
Despite the apparent availability of rights of action for a plaintiff who
feels her privacy has been violated, a plaintiff may actually be unable to
recover in a common law tort action. This is because, in order to recover
on an invasion of privacy tort, a person must show that she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. However, traditionally, a person was thought to
have waived the right to expect privacy when she appeared in public.
The doctrine of waiver of personal privacy in public places had the benefit
of being a bright line test. Furthermore, because it was very difficult to
take a person’s photo without her knowledge and even more difficult to
widely distribute such a photo if it had no intrinsic news value, the
doctrine was not terribly detrimental to the average person’s privacy
expectation.
Today, however, the advent of cell phone cameras and small digital cameras
makes it easy for a person to take another’s photo at any time, often
without the other person’s knowledge. This increases a photographer’s
ability to capture an embarrassing or private moment. The ease and nominal
expense of posting pictures to the internet has also added a new dimension
to invasions of privacy. Therefore, the definition of what constitutes a
reasonable expectation of privacy for tort purposes must change to account
for new technologies. Unfortunately, common law may not be able to overcome
its limiting and unimaginative precedents. Thus real protection will likely
require a legislative fix with clear statutory language that signals an
expansion of personal privacy rights.
The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the “New” Internet: Facebook.com
and MySpace.com
Matthew J.
Hodge.....................................................................................................................................................
95
Facebook.com and MySpace.com are two of the most trafficked Web sites on the
Internet. These Web sites form a "new" type of internet where users can
create profiles and share information like never before. With the exploding
popularity comes the usage by law enforcement of these Web sites to
investigate criminal offenses and the corresponding privacy concerns of
citizens.
The Comment explores Fourth Amendment jurisprudence beginning with Katz v.
United States and continuing with the landmark decisions of Smith v.
Maryland and United States v. Miller. The Comment then discusses Fourth
Amendment cases dealing specifically with cyberspace communications,
including a case out of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, United
States v. Maxwell. The Comment goes on to discuss how a court faced with a
Fourth Amendment issue on Facebook.com or MySpace.com might apply the
holdings from prior cases.
Facebook.com and MySpace.com have default settings which allow almost anyone
to view a profile created on one of these Web sites. However, the sites
also allow users to restrict access to their profiles to only those they
accept or allow to view. This active step creates different issues with
regards to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Web sites also have
privacy policies which allow them to collect information from users and
store the profiles on their central systems. All of these features create
issues a court would likely deal with when presented with Fourth Amendment
inquiry. The Comment discusses these issues and ultimately concludes that
in limited instances, a person should be entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy on these Web sites.
CASENOTES
Endangering the Great Divide: Challenges to the Establishment Clause in Van
Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005)
Erin R.
Doyle..........................................................................................................................................................
123
The hostile tension surrounding the separation of church and state is not
new. In Lynch v. Donnelly, the United States Supreme Court noted “[t]he
Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clause is not a precise, detailed
provision in a legal code capable of ready application.” Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court confronted the volatile issue of the
separation of church and state. The fundamental issue in this case was
whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment allowed the display
of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol
Grounds. In a plurality opinion, the Court concluded the monument did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for the inclusion of
the monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol partook of both
religious and governmental significance.
This Casenote examines the origins of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment as well as the legal background of the exhibition of religious
displays. It also analyzes the negative impact this decision will have on
the Constitutional protections embodied in the Establishment Clause and the
resulting impact on the adherents of religion, as well as the nonadherents.
This Casenote ultimately concludes that the Court’s holding was incorrect
for it is contrary to the predominate intent of the First Amendment. As a
result, the separation between church and state has become more vulnerable
and more imperfect.
Paid Bills v. Charged Bills: Insurance and the Collateral Source Rule Arthur
v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (2005)
Natalie J. Kussart.................................................................................................................................................
151
Currently, Illinois is at the heart of a medical malpractice crisis that has
struck much of the United States. Plaintiffs are often awarded large sums
of money that can potentially include compensatory damages for medical
expenses that were never actually incurred. These large awards ultimately
end up raising the cost of insurance for hospitals and physicians. Because
of the burden on physicians and hospitals caused by the increased cost of
medical liability insurance, it is believed that many physicians have been
discouraged from coming to Illinois and that medical services have become
less available.
In Arthur v. Catour, the defendant tried to limit the damages to the amount
actually paid for the medical bills not the amount that was originally
charged. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled on July 21, 2005 that plaintiffs
could seek damages for the entire amount billed for medical services even
the amounts written-off by insurance companies. In so deciding, however,
the court reached the wrong outcome because it failed to mention past
precedent and failed to answer the certified question on appeal. The
holding of the case should have limited the amount of damages awarded to the
plaintiff to the amount actually paid by the medical insurance carrier
instead of the amount charged by the medical care providers.
This casenote will provide a history of the collateral source rule,
including a brief explanation of the rule and its status in Illinois, and
the issue of reasonableness. It will also provide the facts and procedural
history of Arthur, the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision, and its dissenting
opinion. Finally, the casenote will critique the supreme court’s holding and
analyze the implications of the decision in Illinois.
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