SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
LAW JOURNAL

FORENSIC INDIVIDUALIZATION SCIENCES AND THE CAPITAL JURY: ARE
WITHERSPOON JURORS MORE DEFERENTIAL TO SUSPECT SCIENCE THAN
NON-WITHERSPOON JURORS?
Craig M. Cooley, M.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .477
Forensic scienc//e and capital punishment are increasingly at the forefront of
America’s consciousness. Not a day goes by where the media fails to mention capital
punishment’s various injustices or forensic science’s advancing technology. Forensic
science, which is the application of science to law, has been an invaluable tool for the
criminal justice system for over a century. While forensic science and capital
punishment are hot topics of discussion, they are also invariably intertwined with one
another. This is because capital punishment can only be imposed where a death has
occurred. Thus, it is not surprising that physical evidence is employed by the state
to establish the criminal elements of homicides more so than any other type of
violent crime. As a result, forensic evidence and testimony are essential in deciding
a capital case’s outcome. For one reason or another, it is perceived by many legal
actors, namely judges and attorneys, that jurors typically ascribe more authority to
physical evidence than other evidence. A primary focus of this Article is concerned
with how individualizing forensic evidence is perceived and weighed by individuals
who sit, and do not sit, on capital juries. It was predicted that people who are
permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects) tend to rate forensic
individualization evidence as more trustworthy and thus give it more weight than
people who are excluded from serving on capital juries due to their opposition to the
death penalty (excludable subjects). After reading a brief scenario regarding a
homicide, subjects were asked to rate the various forms of forensic individualization
evidence identified in the homicide scenario. Once completed, respondents answered
a death qualification question. Death-qualified respondents rated the individualization
evidence more reliable, though not significantly, than excludable subjects. Deathqualified
respondents were also more likely than excludables, though not significantly,
to assume the defendant’s guilt based solely on individualization evidence. Lastly,
death-qualified respondents were more prone, though not significantly, to convict the
defendant based exclusively on individualizing evidence. Articles Editor, Elizabeth
Tison.

THE THREAT-TO-SELF DEFENSE AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT
Tara Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
In June, 2002, the United States Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal,
construed the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as permitting the denial
of employment to individuals with disabilities if those individuals pose a risk to
themselves or others. The ADA states that an employer may deny employment
to an individual only if she poses “ a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the work place.” The EEOC, however, interpreted this provision
as also permitting the denial of employment opportunities if the individual
presents a threat to him or herself. The Supreme Court, finding the EEOC
regulations were reasonable, gave them deference in Echazabel. This article
argues that the EEOC went beyond its statutory authority when it added language
to a very clear and unambiguous provision of the ADA, and the Supreme Court
erred in determining the regulations were reasonable. This article further suggests
the Supreme Court’s decision permits the paternalistic practices the drafters of
the ADA sought to eliminate. The article proposes that the Court, and the EEOC,
needs to recognize that disabled individuals deserve the same opportunity to enter
into dangerous occupations that able-bodied individuals enjoy. Articles Editor,
Brandy Glasser.

COMMENTS

COMPUTER LEMON LAWS: AN EVALUATION OF EXISTING DEFECTIVE
COMPUTER REMEDIES AND THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS COMPUTER
LEMON ACT
Maurice R. Griffithe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575
Computers have become an essential part of American life. The problem with
computers is they often break down leaving consumers with troublesome and
often meaningless legal remedies against computer manufacturers and vendors.
This comment discusses current legal remedies available to defective computer
consumers, why those remedies are inadequate to protect consumers, and Illinois’
failed attempt to create a “computer lemon law” specifically designed to combat
existing legal inadequacies. This comment suggests that despite the failed Illinois
attempt, computer lemon laws should be enacted because they are necessary in
today’s technological world.

A LEGAL TWILIGHT ZONE: FROM THE FOURTH TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS AFFORDED A
PRETRIAL DETAINEE?
Tiffany Ritchie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613
It is a well established legal principle that the Fourth Amendment prevents law
enforcement officers from using unreasonable force during the course of an arrest.
However, the standards governing such officers’ behavior become muddled once
the initial arrest is completed and an arrested citizen is subsequently detained (i.e.
placed in the squad car, taken to the station, placed in a holding cell, etc.). Some
courts have determined these detainees must only make a showing of
unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment to prove excessive force. Others
have rejected this notion, and have instead found that such a citizen must prove
the disputed conduct “shocked the conscience” according to the Fourteenth
Amendment. This lack of consensus has highlighted what some judges have
referred to as “ a legal twilight zone.” Working to address this void in our current
legal theory, this comment examines the proposed sources of constitutional
protection, and ultimately concludes that such protection should stem from the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

CASENOTES

THE CASE AGAINST SIMPLICITY: THE SUPREME COURT FAILS TO FIND
ARRESTS FOR MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES UNREASONABLE; ATWATER V.
CITY OF LAGO VISTA, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
Jennifer Sink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court declared warrantless arrests
for minor criminal offenses, even those punishable only by a fine, constitutional.
The Court also declined to adopt a new rule of law forbidding custodial arrests for
crimes which carry no jail time and where the government can show no
compelling need for detention. In recent examination of the Fourth Amendment
by the courts, there has been an increasing trend to support a broader and looser
interpretation of what constitutes unreasonable searches and seizures. This Note
argues the impropriety of the Court’s decision, for its failure to acknowledge
implications on individual liberty, its potential effect of widening police abuse,
and the inability to recognize the trauma and effects of being arrested.

STRADDLING THE FENCE: JUSTICE BREYER’S CONCURRENCE IN BARTNICKI V.
VOPPER GIVES PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND STILL MANAGES TO
PROTECT THE PRESS: BARTNICKI V. VOPPER, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)
Elizabeth Tison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 661
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the first major case to deal with freedom of the press in a
decade, the Supreme Court addressed the stark clash between the rights of a free
news media to broadcast information it obtains and the rights of citizens to keep
telephone conversations private. The Court ruled that the First Amendment
protects the news media even when they broadcast private cellular phone
conversations illegally intercepted by someone else. In so holding, this decision
may be regarded as establishing, once and for all, the proposition that the media
enjoys an immunity for publishing illegally obtained information so long as it did
not participate in any illegality. The casenote will demonstrate that, while the
ultimate decision in the case was correct, the more flexible approach used by
Justice Breyer strikes the appropriate balance between free speech and privacy.
The concurrence is more receptive to restrictions on speech to protect privacy,
but at the same time, could turn out to be less destructive to the press than even
the majority opinion